Supply chain attacks have emerged as a critical threat vector in the U.S.-China technological cold war, enabling adversaries to exploit trusted hardware, software, and service providers rather than attacking networks directly. Global interdependence-especially in semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, and industrial control systems-have embedded risk into U.S. critical infrastructure.

China-specific supply chain risks are increased by the country’s military-civil fusion strategy and national security laws, which compel companies to cooperate with state intelligence activities. This legal and strategic environment challenges traditional assumptions of vendor neutrality and increases the likelihood that commercial technologies may be used for espionage, data exfiltration, or disruption. As a result, supply chain attacks represent not only a technical cybersecurity issue but also a national security concern tied to economic statecraft and geopolitical competition.

Addressing supply chain attacks requires a coordinated national approach that combines cyber, physical, and hardware risk assessments across government and the private sector. The National Risk Assessment and Coordination Model (NRACM) emphasizes centralized risk evaluation, interagency coordination, and proactive mitigation of high-risk technology pathways. By treating supply chains as contested strategic terrain rather than purely commercial systems, the United States can strengthen resilience, reduce foreign dependency risks, and protect long-term technological advantage.